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INTRODUCTION

For years, environmental justice advocates have attempted to distance themselves from the many community groups crying
NIMBY (Not In My Backyard). According to Benjamin Chavis,
former executive director of the NAACP and executive director of
the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice (CRJ),
"[w]e're not saying to take the incinerators and the toxic-waste
dumps out of our communities and put them in white communities-we're saying they should not be in anybody's community."'
Environmental justice advocates insist not on NIMBY, but on
NIABY (Not In Anybody's Backyard).2 Skeptics of the movement
are quick to dismiss such claims, noting that LULUs (Locally Undesirable Land Uses) must be sited somewhere. 3 While the environmental justice movement has generated a voluminous body of
legal scholarship, 4 it has thus far focused almost exclusively on the
I

A Place at the Table: A Sierra Roundtable on Race, Justice, and the
Environment, SIERRA, May-June 1993, at 50.

2

See Michael Heiman, From 'Not in My Backyard!' to 'Not in Anybody's

Backyard!' Grassroots Challenge to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting, 56 AM.
PLAN. ASS'N J. 359 (1990).
3
See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental

Justice and the Siting of Locally UndesirableLand Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
1001 (1993) ("In general, LULUs are considered beneficial to society at large,
and many agree that they should be located somewhere.") [hereinafter Fairness].
4
In addition to the too-numerous-to-mention collection of law review
articles, the movement has generated books, symposia, and conferences. See,
e.g., ROBERT BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE (1994); ROBERT BULLARD, UNEQUAL PROTECTION (1994); ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES AND
SOLUTIONS (Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995); BUNYAN BRYANT & PAUL MOHAI, RACE
AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS (1992); THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Michael J Gerrard ed., 1999); ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
(J. Petrikin ed., 1995); KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AND JUSTICE: READINGS AND COMMENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (1995); Essays on EnvironmentalJustice, 96 W. VA. L. REV. (1994);
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distributional aspects of environmental injustice. However, the
problems of environmental injustice extend beyond distribution.
Environmental law is largely concerned with controlling
negative externalities. For the most part, the negative externalities
produced by locally undesirable land uses ("LULUs") are not directly internalized, but rather regulated by various levels of government.5 Generally, environmental regulation seeks to set pollution at the level at which its marginal costs equals its marginal
benefits. 6 The political process, however, is not perfect. Environmental injustice exposes a process failure in the regulation of LULUs; because minorities and the poor are unable to overcome problems of collective action, information, and discrimination, the environmental costs imposed upon them are not fully considered
within the political process.7 As a result, pollution that is socially
inefficient 8 is permitted. Viewed through this lens, environmental
justice is not just about allocating harms fairly-it fundamentally
impacts the total level of harm.
In Part I of this Article I briefly outline the environmental
justice movement. I describe the growth of the movement, the
studies lending support to it, and the largely unsuccessful legal
challenges to allegedly discriminatory siting. I also address the
subsequent challenges to the evidence of environmental injustice,
and the "chicken-or-the-egg" controversy.
In Part II, I describe the siting process. The negative externalities generated by LULUs could be internalized via a property
Symposium: Environmental Justice, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (199394); Urban Environmental Issues, 3 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y

(1996); UrbanEnvironmentalJustice, ThirdAnnual Stein Center Symposium on
Contemporary Urban Challenges,21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (1994).
5
See Part II.B.
6
This is true even when statutes ostensibly forbid cost benefit balancing.
See Daniel Esty, Taking Environmental Rights Seriously (March 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
7
The analogy between the political process and market economics is
commonly referred to as "public choice theory." See Part III.A.
8
Throughout this article efficiency refers to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A
proposal is efficient under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion if the total gains of the
proposal would exceed the total harm, such that winners under the proposal
could (although do not necessarily have to) compensate losers. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (4th ed., 1992).
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regime. I explore how such a system could operate before delving
into the multi-jurisdictional regulatory system currently in place, as
well as the important role played by private firms and individuals.
In Part III, I introduce public choice theory as a means of
analogizing process failure to market externalities. Procedural environmental justice failures occur in two distinct forms. First, because the poor generally have less time, money, education, and political connections, they will be less likely to succeed in overcoming collective action and information problems associated with siting battles. Second, racism may cause political actors to irrationally avoid forming coalitions with minorities.
In Part IV, I describe the potential inefficiencies to which
environmental injustice may contribute. Broadly stated, environmental injustice may lead to inefficient levels of activity, inefficient siting, and inefficient remediation. Introducing these inefficiencies can potentially change the environmental justice debate in
profound ways.
Finally, in Part V, I consider the various solutions scholars
have proposed to address environmental injustice in terms of
remedying this inefficiency.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT

The history of the environmental justice movement could, and
does, fill several books. 9 In this part I merely wish to sketch its
broad contours.
A. The Beginning of the Movement
The beginning of the environmental justice movement is
usually attributed to the controversy surrounding the siting of a
PCB landfill in the heavily poor and minority Warren County,
North Carolina in 1982.10 Adopting the protest techniques of the
9

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4.

10

See Ken Geiser & Gerry Waneck, PCBs and Warren County, in UN-

PROTECTION 49, supra note 4, for a description of the Warren County
battle. But see Robert Bullard, Environmental Justicefor All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION 3, supra note 4 (describing pre- 1982 environmental justice stories that
failed to capture national attention).
EQUAL
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civil rights movement, Warren County residents focused national
attention on their struggle, coining the phrase "environmental racism"" to describe the siting of environmental harms in minority
communities.
Although they were unsuccessful in blocking the landfill,
Warren County residents put the distribution of environmentally
harmful land uses on the political agenda. In 1983, the General
Accounting Office released its study of four southern landfills,
concluding that blacks made up a majority of residents surrounding
three of the four sites.' 2 Four years later the United Church of
Christ's Commission for Racial Justice published a far more comprehensive study of hazardous waste siting. Examining 415 hazardous waste facilities, the study found that these dumpsites were
significantly more likely to be located in poor and minority com13
munities.
While these were hardly the only studies to find that minorities and the poor disproportionately bore environmental
harms, 14 the existence of popularly accessible empirical data was
1I
This Article employs the term "environmental justice" rather than "environmental racism" or "environmental equity." In doing so I attempt to capture
both the class and race components of the problem. Additionally, "environmental racism" sometimes carries the connotation of intentional racism that I
wish to avoid. While "environmental equity" is often used as a synonym for
"environmental justice," the latter seems to have achieved common acceptance
in the literature. For a discussion of this terminology, see EDWARDO LAO RHODES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 14-19 (2003). As an initial matter, I
define environmental justice as the fair allocation of environmental harms and
benefits. Of course, the word "fair" is subject to numerous definitions. See Vicki
Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? EnvironmentalJustice and the Siting
of Locally UndesirableLand Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993). I will return to this issue in Part V.C, infra.
12
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF
SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).

United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes
and Race in the United States, A National Report on the Racial and SocioEconomic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites (1987)
[hereinafter UCC Study].
14
For an excellent synopsis of pre-1992 environmental justice studies, see
BRYANT & MOHAI, supra note 1, at 165-69. In addition to the sources cited
there, a 1992 National Law Journal report was also especially influential. It
found that the EPA assessed significantly lower civil penalties in minority
13
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key in uniting numerous local groups into a national movement.
In 1990 the University of Michigan held a conference entitled
"Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A time for
Discourse. ' 6 One year later, the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice organized the "First National People of
Color Environmental Leadership Summit," which produced Principles of Environmental Justice, the defining document of the
movement. 17
Two environmental justice bills were introduced in Congress in the early 1990s. The Environmental Justice Act of 1992
would have limited toxic facilities in the communities suffering the
greatest environmental harm. 18 The Environmental Rights Act of
1993 would have prohibited waste dumpsites in environmentally
disadvantaged communities.' Congress failed to pass either bill.
Environmental justice proponents' biggest success at the
federal level was President Clinton's Executive Order 12,898.0
The order requires that federal agencies identify and when appropriate, address disproportionate environmental impacts of their
programs. Despite some initial success, the order has not had a ma21
jor effect on environmental injustice.

communities, and that the cleanup of superfund sites took longer in poor and
minority communities. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection:
The Racial Divide in EnvironmentalLaw, NAT'L L.J. Sep. 21, 1992 at S2.
15
The stories of individual communities fighting for environmental justice have been collected and published in a number of books. See, e.g., UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 4; LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM
THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001); ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE, POLITICAL

STRUGGLES (David E. Camacho ed., 1998).
16
See BRYANT & MOHAI, supra note 4, at 4.
17
Principles of Environmental Justice, Proceedings, The First National
People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, reprinted in CLIFFORD
RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY,
AND REGULATION 22-24 (2002).
18
H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993).
19
H.R. 1924, 103d Cong. (1993).
20
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
21
See Sean Walsh & Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Restoration: Challenges for the New Millennium: Environmental Justice and Procedural Safeguards: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration, 42 ARIZ. L. REV.
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B. Growing Pains

While the movement was able to achieve an increased political profile, environmental justice advocates found little success
in the courts. In three cases, 22 courts rejected minority communities' equal protection 23 claims, finding that the plaintiffs seeking to
block environmentally harmful land uses had either failed to provide sufficient evidence of disparate impact 24 or failed to prove
discriminatory intent. 25 Plaintiffs have been equally unsuccessful
in advancing environmental justice claims based on Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.26
In addition to courtroom difficulties, the environmental justice movement was challenged by a number of studies in the mid1990s challenging the evidence of discriminatory siting and expo525, 533-34 (2000) (criticizing agency implementation of Executive Order
12,898 for being merely pro forma).
22
Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management, 482 F.Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex.
1979), aff'd without opinion, 782 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1986); East Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Association v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission706 F.Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989);
R.I.S.E. v. Kay, 768 F.Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd without opinion, 977
F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 1.
23
24
Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management, 482 F.Supp. 673.
25
East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v. Macon-Bibb County
Planningand Zoning Commission706F.Supp. 880; R.I.S.E. v. Kay, 768 F.Supp.
1144. Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, plaintiffs asserting an equal protection claim must show more than disparate impact of a
policy, they must show discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development
Co., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). This is an extremely difficult evidentiary hurdle to
clear.
26
42 U.S.C. 2000d to 2000d-7 (2000). This provision bars racial discrimination in any program receiving federal funds. Although Title VI also requires discriminatory intent, many agencies' implementing regulations allowed
claims based on discriminatory effect. Such claims were foreclosed, however,
when the Supreme Court ruled that no private right of action existed to enforce
Title VI regulations. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). For a discussion of legal theories potentially available to environmental justice proponents,
see THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 3-184 (Michael B. Gerrard ed.,
1999).
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sure. An influential University of Massachusetts study conducted
in 1994 examined over five hundred hazardous waste facilities and
found no evidence of discriminatory siting. 27 Additionally, scholars challenged the earlier studies' methodologies, including the
sample selection, the definition of minority, the geographic
scope
28
variables.
other
for
control
to
failure
examined, and the
In a series of articles, Vicki Been set forth a particularly
powerful critique of environmental justice studies. 29 Been notes
that most studies examined the contemporary makeup of a
neighborhood impacted by a LULU, not its makeup at the time of
siting.3 This method ignores the possibility that a LULU would
lower nearby housing prices, causing affluent residents to move
away. These residents would be replaced by lower-income individuals, attracted by the lower housing prices. As a result of these
market dynamics, even LULUs located in a wealthy neighborhood
could later become surrounded by the poor. 3 1 This "chicken-or-the2
egg" dilemma has plagued the environmental justice literature.3
C. The State of Environmental Justice

27

See Douglas L. Anderton et al., Hazardous Waste Facilities: "Envi-

ronmental Equity" Issues in Metropolitan Areas, 18 EVALUATION REV. 123
(1994).
28

See

JAMES P. LESTER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE IN THE

UNITED STATES: MYTHS AND REALITIES 9-14 (2000) (reviewing the studies of
environmental justice and the critiques thereof).
29
See Vicki Been, Locally UndesirableLand Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: DisproportionateSiting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383
(1994) [hereinafter Market Dynamics]; Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do
With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land
Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993) [hereinafter Fairness];Vicki Been with
Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios?A Longitudinal
Analysis of EnvironmentalJustice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Coming to the Nuisance].
30
Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 27, at 1385-92.
31
Id. at 1385-86.
32
See, e.g., Robert Bullard, A New "Chicken-or-Egg" Debate: Which
Came First-The Neighborhood or the Toxic Dump?, 19 THE WORKBOOK 60
(1994); Lynn E. Blais, EnvironmentalRacism Reconsidered, 75 N.C.L. REV. 75
(1996); Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, EnvironmentalInequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195 (1997).
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While these empirical questions have generated a spirited
debate in the scholarly literature, and probably increased the rigor
of environmental justice studies, this Article's focus lies elsewhere.
The sum of the evidence shows, with some degree of confidence,
that the poor and minorities disproportionately suffer from exposure to environmental harms. According to Luke Cole and Sheila
Foster:
Since the 1960s, researchers have analyzed the distribution of numerous environmental hazards: garbage dumps, air pollution, lead poisoning, toxic
waste production and disposal, pesticide poisoning,
noise pollution, occupational hazards, and rat bites.
Their overwhelming conclusion is that these enviare inequitably distributed by inronmental hazards
33
race.
come or
To what extent this phenomenon is caused by disproportionate siting as opposed to market dynamics is less clear, with relatively little support for either proposition. 34 Both explanations make sense
intuitively, and likely both play a role.
Finally, while achieving limited success at the federal level,
movement advocates have managed to pass several state and local
environmental justice acts. 35 Perhaps more importantly, the movement has given countless communities a common rallying cry in
their struggles for local environmental justice. 36 Indeed, there is
33

COLE & FOSTER, supra note 15, at 54-55. These authors include an

appendix listing over one hundred studies and articles documenting the disproportionate impact of environmental harm. Id. at 167.
34
The main study on this topic is presented in Been & Gupta, Coming to
the Nuisance, supra note 29. Been and Gupta found no significant evidence that
hazardous waste facilities were sited in disproportionately poor or black
neighborhoods between 1970 and 1990, little change in post-siting neighborhood demographics, but significantly disproportionately high minority communities surrounding the facilities at the time of the study. Id. at 9. This is apparent
inconsistency may be explained by pre-1970 sittings. Id. at 32.
35
These laws will be discussed in Part V, infra.
36
See sources cited in note 14, supra. Several regional environmental
justice networks now exist that support coalition-forming and attempt to provide
resources to communities engaged in such struggles. Links to several of these
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little doubt that the environmental justice movement has matured
into a potent political force.
II. THE SITING PROCESS

The environmental justice movement has focused on the placement
of environmentally harmful land uses. 37 In this Part I outline how
the siting process occurs. The goal here is not to offer a comprehensive account, but simply to demonstrate that the process is extremely complex, involving interactions between various levels of
government and private parties. The siting process, as currently
constituted, relies almost exclusively upon government regulation.
I begin with a discussion of an alternative scheme, based on property entitlements and direct internalization of harms. Environmental regulation can be understood as a substitute for the administratively difficult system of direct internalization.
A. Imagining LULU Regimes
The problem with LULUs at the most basic level is the
problem of externalities. 38 A LULU owner does not make socially
optimal decisions because she only considers the harms and benefits that accrue to her property. If a polluting factory generates
benefits that accrue to its owner but causes harm to others, the
owner is incentivized to continue even if the harm is greater than
the benefit.
The Anglo-American legal system initially managed LULUs by allowing neighbors the right to enjoin polluters from operating. Early nuisance cases held a landowner strictly liable for the
networks are available at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/links.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2005).
37
While this is traditionally the focus of environmental justice, many
advocates also point to the unequal distribution of environmental amenities, for
example parks. See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Environmental Laws: Grist for the
Equal ProtectionMill, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 397 (1999). This Article examines only the distribution of harms.
38
Externalities are defined here as the infliction of harm or benefit on
others such that the effect is not reflected in market transactions. See PAUL A.
SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 347 (15th ed. 1995).
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spillover of harm. For example, in Aldred's Case, a seventeenth
century action, the court enjoined the defendant from operating a
pig sty because the stench interfered with the plaintiff's enjoyment

of his land. 39 This rule reflected the absolutist notion of property
rights at the time; 40 a view that held sway through most of the
nineteenth century. As LULUs became more common through the
industrial revolution, courts gradually shifted to offering damages

rather than injunctions as the remedy for nuisance.4'
This early nuisance regime demonstrates two of the four
possibilities for managing the spillover of harms developed by
Calabresi and Malamed. Under their framework, entitlements
may be placed with either the polluter or the victim, and the entitlement may be protected by either property or a liability rule.43 In
Aldred's Case, the landowner was granted an entitlement to be free
from odors and was protected by a property rule-that is, Aldred
had the right to an injunction. Alternatively, Aldred could have
been granted the entitlement and protected by a liability rule under
which he could only recover court-determined damages. 44 Con39
40

Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
See Louise Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York

Court of Appeals, 1850-1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 306 (1989) ("The principle of
nuisance liability was that one could not.., do that which endangered or annoyed or interfered with a neighbor's property. If a use offended, it was simply
incumbent upon the owner to cease the use or move it elsewhere.").
41
For a history of the nuisance law during this period, see Joel Franklin
Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. Legal Stud. 403
(1974); John P. S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the IndustrialRevolution-Some
Lessons From SocialHistory, 3 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 155 (1980).
42
Guido Calabresi & Bernard Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
43
Id.
44
As the nuisance regime developed in American law, this result became
more common. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.
1970) (finding that the operation of a cement plant was a nuisance, but awarding
damages rather than an injunction). While Boomer famously split with prior
precedent, see id. at 872, ("The rule in New York has been that such a nuisance
will be enjoined although marked disparity be shown in economic consequence
between the effect of the injunction and the effect of the nuisance."), Louise
Halper suggests that New York courts awarded damages for nuisances in the late
nineteenth century as well. See Halper, supra note 37, at 302 ("But the solution
in Boomer... has, it seems, centenarian ancestors in the New York Court of
Appeals.").
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versely, the polluter could be given the entitlement to emit odors,
which in turn could be protected by property or liability rules.45
Ronald Coase, in his extremely influential article, The
Problem of Social Cost, noted that absent transaction costs the initial placement of the entitlement will not affect the ultimate outcome. 46 To use Aldred's Case as an example, suppose that the pig
sty operation was worth $50 dollars to the defendant, but caused
Aldred $60 in harm. If the entitlement is placed with the defendant,
Aldred can offer him any amount between $50 and $60 to halt the
operation and he will accept. If the entitlement were placed with
Aldred, the defendant would not offer more than $50 to settle the
nuisance case, which Aldred would not accept, and so the operation would also halt. In either case we reach the socially optimal
result.
47
Of course, the world is not free from transaction costs.
The basic point, however, remains unchanged. Defining and enWhile it is more difficult to imagine how these rules might protect a
polluter, there is some precedent. In Spur Industries,Inc. v. Del. E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972), the court awarded the plaintiff an injunction against a feedlot, but because the plaintiff had developed residential
housing in the immediate vicinity of the preexisting feedlot, required the plaintiff to indemnify the defendant for the cost of moving or closing the business.
This represents a liability rule for a polluter entitlement. Under a property rule,
the court would simply deny such an injunction.
46
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
Coase's theorem has generated a great deal of legal scholarship. For a summary
see Coase Theorem Symposium, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 557 - Part 1 (1973);
Coase Theorem Symposium - Part II, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1974).
Perhaps the most influential critique of the Coase Theorem deals with
the wealth effect. Because the grant of the initial entitlement confers wealth on a
set of individuals (for example, pig sty owners) they will have additional resources to spend on related products (for example sty fences). The strong version of the Coase theorem, that without transaction costs the initial entitlement
has no effect on allocation at all, is now generally rejected in favor of the weak
version, which states that, in a world without transaction costs, individuals will
bargain to reach a pare to efficient outcome regardless of the initial entitlement.
See generally, Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of
Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (1972).
47
Transaction costs are ""[t]the costs of making exchanges, including the
costs of formulating bargains and contracts, and the costs, in terms of delays and
losses of opportunities for mutually advantageous exchanges, of strategic behavior." A. BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 126 (1985).
45
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forcing entitlements leads to socially optimal outcomes by eliminating uncompensated externalities. 48 The genius of private property, that it internalizes the effects of land use,49 can be extended to
spillovers simply by protecting entitlements.
The problem with such a regime is that it is extremely
costly to define and enforce every entitlement. Aldred may suffer
$60 of harm as a result of the pig sty, but from a societal standpoint it makes little sense to enforce his right to an injunction if a
trial and subsequent enforcement would cost $600. An optimal system of pollution control does not maximize the value of polluting
activity less the harms of pollution; it
must also consider the ad5°
ministrative costs of the system itself.
Establishing private property entitlements is among the
most expensive systems of managing spillovers. 5' These costs include the cost of demarcating the extent of the entitlements, defending those boundaries, and proving whether they have been
breached. 52 These problems are especially prominent for environIt may be argued that granting an entitlement to a polluter does not
eliminate an externality, it legitimates it. The counterargument is that no activity
in and of itself causes harm, only the interaction of activities. The operation of a
pig sty would not have harmed Aldred unless Aldred used his property for habitation. As long as the sty owner's entitlement is clearly defined, he knows that
he is foregoing the payments he might receive from Aldred to halt its operation,
and therefore (in theory) the sty owner is properly incentivized to consider the
external effects of his actions.
49
See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 347 (1967) ("[T]he main allocative function of property rights is the internalization of beneficial and harmful effects.").
50
This point is analogous to Calabresi's analysis of the costs of accidents,
which includes the harm caused by the accidents, the costs of avoiding accidents, and the costs of administering the system. GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS
48

OF ACCIDENTS

26-28 (1970).

See Carol Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategies for Common Resources, 41 DuKE L.J. 1, 9 (1991). Rose describes
four strategies for managing common resources, do nothing, keepout (which
protects existing users but bans newcomers), rightway (regulation), and prop
(private property), noting that the strategies are progressively more costly to
administer. Id.
52
See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, at
1328-30 (1993). Richard Epstein notes that modem nuisance law does not endorse absolute property rights for this reason. See Richard Epstein, Nuisance
51

82

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL 13

mental entitlements, where harms are difficult to detect, causation
is difficult to establish, and information costs are especially high 3
As a result, American Law has drifted away from direct cost internalization and towards the regulatory framework explored in the
following Section.
B. Multi-level regulation
Government regulation has largely replaced direct costinternalization in environmental law. The laws and regulations that
govern the siting of a LULU vary greatly with the size, location,
and type of the facility. This Section outlines the regulatory regimes some common LULUs face, with a focus on the participatory mechanisms embodied therein.
1. Federal
The siting of hazardous waste sites has garnered much attention in the environmental justice debate.5 4 Hazardous waste
sites are regulated at the federal level by the Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 55 The statute directs the EPA to regulate hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities (TSDFs) "as
may be necessary to protect human
56
environment."
the
health and
Subtitle C of RCRA is primarily concerned with setting
minimum standards for hazardous waste management. Detailed
regulations specify requirements for, inter alia, security, 57 emLaw: Corrective Justice and Its UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49, 74-

77 (1979).

Jeffrey Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 177, 188-202 (1983); Janet V. Siegel, Negotiatingfor Environmental
Justice, 10 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 147, 169-71 (2002) (describing the high costs of
developing the expert testimony necessary to prove an environmental toxic tort
or nuisance suit).
54
See, e.g., United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, supra note 11; Coming to the Nuisance, supra note 24.
55
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939e (2005).
56
42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (2005).
57
40 C.F.R. § 264.14 (2005).
53
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6
59
ployee training, 58 record-keeping, ground water monitoring, 0
and corrective action. 6 1 The EPA manages a permit system for
TSDFs, which includes public notice and comment requirements
for individual facilities.6 2 While RCRA does contain some siting

requirements, 63 it impacts environmental justice not by its effect on
but rather by its effect on the characwhere a facility will be cited,
64
teristics of such facilities.
Hazardous waste is also governed by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).65 CERCLA is primarily concerned with the cleanup of past
hazardous waste contamination. The law imposes strict, joint and
sites 66
several liability on owners and operators of hazardous waste
and established a "superfund" to pay for the cleanup of abandoned
sites. 67
The other paradigmatic LULU, an air polluting factory or
incinerator, is also governed by federally mandated minimum
standards. The Clean Air Act 68 requires the EPA to establish na-

tional ambient air quality standards that "allowing an adequate
margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.",69 States

then develop state implementation plans in order to meet the stan-

40 C.F.R. § 264.16 (2005).
40 C.F.R. § 264.70-.77 (2005).
40 C.F.R. § 264.97 (2005).
40 C.F.R. § 264.550-.555 (2005).
40 C.F.R. §§ 124.1, 124.10-14 (2005).
These prohibit the placement of a TSDF near active faults, and places
additional regulations on facilities in 100-year floodplains. 40 C.F.R. § 264.18
(2005).
64
For a discussion of how broad national standards may be lower than
optimal because of environmental injustice, see discussion infra Parts III.B.
65
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (2005).
66
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2005). These are the primary "potentially responsible parties." The law includes current owners and operators as well as the owners and operators at the time of contamination, individuals that arranged for disposal and treatment of the hazardous waste, and individuals that accepted the
waste. Id.
67
26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2005).
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (2005).
68
69
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2005).
58
59
60
61
62
63
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dards.7 0 Federal law mandates that states include a permitting
process for all major industrial sources. 7 1 Such permitting programs must include public notice and an opportunity for the public
to comment.72
The National Environmental Policy Act 73 (NEPA) provides
another federal vehicle for public participation in the siting process. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental
impact statement (EIS) for "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment., 7 4 This includes private activities that are "approved by permit." 7 5 Agencies must solicit and respond to comments when drafting an EIS.7 6 Additionally, lawsuits challenging the adequacy of an EIS can often delay,
or even kill a proposed project.77
In sum, federal law sets minimum standards for a variety of
LULUs, but is rarely directly involved in a siting decision. 7 ' However, federal public participation requirements may provide legal
weapons in the political battles that surround specific projects.
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2005). States have broad discretion in developing
their implementation plans. The classic statement interpreting the EPA's discretion to disapprove a SIP comes from Train v. National Resources Defense
Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975): "[S]o long as the ultimate effect of a State's choice
of emission limitations is in compliance with the national standards for ambient
air, the State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems
best suited to its particular situation." Id. at 79.
The degree of autonomy, however, should not be overstated. The EPA
has developed extensive regulations governing what an implementation plan
must include. 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-51 (2005).
71
42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f(2005).
72
42 U.S.C. § 766la(B)(6) (2005).
73
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (2005).
74
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2005).
75
40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(4) (2005).
76
40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1, 1503.4 (2005).
77
See Tom Turner, The Legal Eagles, AMICUS J. 25 (Winter 1988) (detailing projects that were abandoned as a result of NEPA lawsuits);
78 States are often able to insist on stricter requirements, but are unable to drop
below the federal rules. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2005) (allowing states to
regulate air pollution more stringently than the Clean Air Act, but prohibiting
less stringent rules); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only
from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DuKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225, 264 n. 139 (1997) (listing federal environmental laws
that allow for more, but not less stringent regulations).
70
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2. State

States play a prominent role in the siting process. Returning
to the hazardous waste facility example, Rachel Godsil identifies
three broad categories of state regulation: super review, site designation, and local control.79
States that employ super review adopt a two step process
for site approval. First, a facility developer applies to the state environmental agency for approval along objective criteria.8 ° If the
agency finds the site suitable, the application is passed along to a
special site review board. These boards typically include government officials and local representatives. 8 1 The boards usually hold
public meetings,82 allowing a degree of public input. Although the
siting boards universally have the power to preempt local opposition, 8 super review allows citizens to use "informal
connections in
4
NIMBYism.8
facilitate
to
government"
state
Some states adopt an incentives-based approach aimed at
quelling local opposition through compensation. 8 These laws vary
Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV.
394, 403, 405 (1991). This taxonomy was subsequently adopted by Bradford
Mank. See Bradford C. Mank, EnvironmentalJustice and DiscriminatorySiting:
Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 329,
348 (1995). See generally William B. Johnson, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Hazardous Waste Regulations, 86 A.L.R.4th, 401 (2004).
80
See Mank, id at 349; Godsil, id at 403-404. Objective criteria include
considerations such as seismic activity, flood plains, geology, and hydrology.
See id, at 403 n.82.
81
For example, in Connecticut the Siting Council includes nine government officials (both agency heads, and appointees of legislative leaders and the
governor) and four local representatives (three from the effected municipality
and one from a neighboring municipality). CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-50j (2005).
In Maine, the siting board includes ten members appointed by the governor, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 341-C (2005), and four members appointed by the
local legislative body, ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1319-R (2005).
82
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. L. ANN. tit. 38, § 324.11117(4) (2005); ME REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1319-R (2005).
83
Mank, supra note 79, at 349.
84
Godsil, supra note 79, at 405.
85
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-80 (2004) (granting 5% of hazard79

ous waste facilities' total revenue to the host municipality); R.I. GEN. LAWS

§
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widely in their methods of compensation; some are remedial while
others are preventative. Some are ex-post while others are ex-ante.
Finally the laws adopt a number of approaches to determining the
level of compensation. 86 Compensated siting laws that require
community-developer agreements provide the greatest degree of
because the community must affirmatively acpublic participation
87
site.
waste
a
cept
State regulation is also important outside of the hazardous
waste realm. States retain the primary authority in implementing
the Clean Air Act, which governs air polluting LULUs. 8 8 Some
states also allow state agencies to override local ordinances restricting power plants. 89 Additionally, fifteen states have adopted
"little NEPAs" allowing public notice and comment on environmentally sensitive projects. 90
Finally, several states have adopted environmental justice
9
1
laws. These laws vary in their approaches; some require examination of socioeconomic data during the siting process, 92 others
prohibit the concentration of facilities, 93 while others merely allow
environmental justice to be considered in the siting process.
3. Local

23-19.7-8 (2005) (allowing developers and communities to negotiate siting
agreements). See generally Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It
Time to Pay Attention?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787 (1994).
86
See Mank, supra note 79, at 358-65. See generally Been supra note 87.
87
See Vicki L. Been, Compensated Siting Proposals:Is it Time to Pay
Attention?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 813-822 (describing siting agreement
laws in Massachusetts and Wisconsin).
8 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2005); see also supra note 65.
89
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-50i (2004); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE 25525
(2004); Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C.L.
REv. 1031, 1095-96 (2003).
90
See Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA Law and Litigation § 12.1 (2d ed.,
1992).
91
See LESTER, supra note 28, at 164-69 (discussing state environmental
justice legislation); Gerrard, supra note 4, at 142-149 (same).
92
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-A-325(a) (1994).
93
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 86-1501 to 1504 (2004) (creating a presump-

tion against locating solid waste facilities within twelve miles of another).
94
See AL. CODE § 22-30-5.1 (1991).
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Municipalities are also heavily involved in the siting process, primarily through zoning. Zoning ordinances are intended to
separate incompatible uses by dividing a municipality into several
zones with varying levels of use restrictions. 95 Zoning inevitably
creates winners and losers, and has been described as the most po96
litical of local functions.
Initially, a municipality must devise a zoning map, often in
conjunction with a comprehensive plan that will demarcate where
LULUs may be located. The typical zone allows certain uses "as
of right" and others only upon approval from an administrative
board. 98 A developer seeking to place a facility in a zone that prohibits a particular use may seek to amend the zoning ordinance,
that is, either change the boundaries of or uses permitted within
that zone,99 or request a variance (an exemption from the ordi00
nance). 1
Each step of the process allows for considerable public participation. The initial drafting of a comprehensive plan usually includes citizen participation mechanisms.' 0 ' Both conditional use
and variance applications allow citizens to informally pressure decisionmakers. 10 2 Zoning amendments often include public hearings
0 3
or notice and comment procedures.1
Finally, at least one municipality-New York City-has
adopted its own environmental justice ordinance. New York's fair
share ordinance requires the city to establish siting criteria that will
95
96

97
98

99

100

DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.04 (5th ed. 2003).
See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING § 3.1 (1985).

MANDELKER, supra note 97, at § 3.13.
MANDELKER, supra note 97, at § 6.39.
Id. at § 6.24.

Id. at § 6.39.

Id. at § 3.04.
See Kaswan, supra note 91, at 1117-19 (describing how the discretion
afforded to these decisionmakers allows "a considerable role for local political
judgments). States vary greatly in the judicial deference granted to these decisions. See id.; MANDELKER supra note 92, at §§ 6.57-.58 (describing levels of
discretion for conditional uses); Id. at §§ 6.39-.52 (describing judicial discretion
towards variances).
103
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 346-47 (2d ed., 2000) (collecting studies that attempt to
measure the efficacy of public involvement in rezoning).
101
102
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"further the fair distribution among communities
of the burdens
0 4
facilities."'
city
with
associated
and benefits
4. Private firms
Despite this heavy overlay of government action, individuals and private firms continue to play an important, if not dominant, role in the siting process. First, in almost every case, a facility
developer initiates the process. The developer examines potential
sites, conferring with private engineers and lawyers, and often purchases property before applying for any initial permits. The public
learns about the project only after a private firm has considered
and rejected all but one site. The developer then begins a public
relations campaign to mollify the impacted community. This process has been dubbed the "decide-announce--defend" model."'
The community slated for siting also has a variety of extralegal options. Activists in many environmental justice battles have
adopted direct action techniques such as protests and civil disobedience.106 Additionally, negative media
coverage can produce sub0 7
developers.'
private
for
stantial costs
III. ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE AS EXTERNALITY

104

105

N.Y. CITY .CHARTER. § 203 (a) (2004).
See O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 6-9

(1983); COLE & FOSTER, supra note 15, at 110-11.
106
For example, in Warren County, Pennsylvania, the site of the first environmental justice fight to garner national attention, more than 500 residents were
arrested for demonstrating against a proposed PCB landfill. See BULLARD, UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 4, at 5. Countless environmental justice activists
have adopted direct action techniques. See, e.g., id. at 213 (describing the direct
action tactics of South Central Los Angeles residents fighting a solid waste incinerator); COLE & FOSTER, supra note 15, at 39-43 (Chester, Pennsylvania residents fighting a waste incinerator); id. at 86-87 (Buttonwillow, California protests against a toxic waste dump).
107
See Patrick Slevin, Column's Environmental and land use law: A Discussion: NIMBYISM (not-in-my-backyard): A Mandate for Citizen Participation?, 78 FLA. BAR J 38, 40 (2004) (describing the "expensive setbacks" negative media can cause).
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The story of LULU regimes in America is regulation stepping in
for market failure. The early system of nuisance became unworkable as the industrial revolution increased the number of spillovers,
driving a vast increase in the administrative costs of the system.
This problem is especially troublesome for environmental LULUs
because of the dramatic information problems posed by pollution.
In response to these market failures the various levels of government have replaced market allocation with regulation.
Although government regulation of LULUs can be understood at least partially as removing siting decisions from the marketplace, public choice theory suggests regulation simply substitutes one market for another. Rather than bargaining over entitlements, as in a Coasian world, individuals promoting or opposing a
LULU must now take part in a market for regulation. In this Part I
explain how government failure, analogous to market failure, may
misallocate LULUs.
The regulatory regime contributes to environmental injustice in two ways. First, the poor may be unable to effectively participate in the political process due to a lack of time, money, or
education. Second, an entrenched majority may systematically refuse to join coalitions with a political minority (especially a racial
minority), preventing these groups from influencing the political
process.
A. Public Choice Theory
Traditional pluralist political theory took the somewhat optimistic view that the competition between interest groups resulted
in more-or-less efficient legislation. The basic notion was that
groups would expend resources in the political arena in proportion
to their interest in a specific decision. A small group that is heavily
advantaged by legislation would be offset by a large group that is
slightly harmed. 108 Legal structures, such as federalism or checks

108

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice,

57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 86 (1990). See generally ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961); EARL LATHAM,
THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS; A STUDY INBASING-POINT LEGISLATION (1952).
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and balances, could be designed to channel interest group competition towards the public good.10 9
Public choice theory-"the application of economics to political science' 10 -challenges this view. Under public choice theory, individuals behave in the political realm as they do in the economic realm; that is, they are rational utility maximizers."' l The
ramifications of this view are many, but the key insight for our
purposes is that the market failures that occur in the private sector
may be replicated in the political process.ll2
Perhaps the most well-known theory of public choice is
Mancur Olson's theory of collective action." 3 Legislation that
benefits large, diffuse groups is subject to the collective action dilemma. Although each member of the group would be better off
109

This concept traces its lineage to James Madison's work in the Federal-

ist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), ("To secure the public
good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time
to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.").
110
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 1 (2003). For an excellent
introduction to public choice theory as it applies to law, see DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILLIP P. FRiCKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
III
See MUELLER, supra note 112, at 2. The counterpoint to public choice
theory is civic republicanism, which argues that the political process is not
analogous to the market, rather individuals seek to enhance the public good
through deliberation with their fellow citizens. For an introduction to civic republicanism, see Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988).
The explanatory power of these two models is the subject of intense
scholarly debate. For the purposes of this article, I adopt only a modest view of
public choice theory: individuals sometimes behave, in the political process, in a
manner that maximizes their own utility, even at the expense of the public good.
As Saul Levmore notes "Public choice does not, or at least need not, claim to be
the only game in town... [it] might explain or inform a good many things, even
as there are matters better explained or even only explained with some other
tool." Saul Levmore, Symposium: Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of
the Regulatory State Comment: From Cynicism to Positive Theory in Public
Choice, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 376 (2002).
112
For some examples of government failure, see WILLIAM C. MITCHELL
& RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITICS 85-194 (2004).
113
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).

2005]

NOT IN ANYBODY'S BACKYARD

with the legislation, each individual is not adequately incentivized
to take action in support of the legislation because of their relatively small stake. 11 Each individual will attempt to free ride on
other group members' activity in support of the legislation. For
small, intensely effected groups on the other hand, the benefits of
the legislation are greater than the costs of taking action in favor of
the legislation. According to the theory of collective action the political process will often benefit small interested groups at the expense of the public at large.
Legislation that benefits a small group at the expense of a
larger group may or may not be beneficial to society in general. An
interest group supporting legislation that imposes net costs on society at large, but benefits the interest group, is said to be "rent
seeking."" The classic examples of rent seeking are tariffs. The
domestic steel industry, for example, will expend significant resources lobbying Congress for steel tariffs because the industry
will benefit greatly from their imposition. Steel tariffs, however,
increase the costs of essentially every product that includes steel,
so the average consumer will be worse off. The total harm to consumers is greater than the total benefit to the steel industry, but because of the collective action dilemma, the steel industry may succeed. 16
One further insight of the public choice literature informs
the environmental justice debate. The political process must adopt
some method for aggregating the preferences of individuals into a
final decision. Different voting rules can lead to different out114

"Action in support of legislation" includes not only what one would

typically think of as lobbying, or coalition forming, but also information gathering. This is an important distinction. Unlike traditional economics, which assumes a fully informed consumer, modem economics and public choice theory
recognize that information is costly to gather. In order to effectively impact the
outcome of a political decision, one must become informed on that topic, and on
the workings of the decisionmaking process. See Denis J. Brion, An Essay on
LULU,NIMBY, and the Problem of DistributiveJustice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 437, 444 (1988) (noting that participation requires two types of resources,
those that enable participation, and those that are the substance of participation).
"5
See GORDON TULLOCK ET AL., GOVERNMENT FAILURE 43 (2002).
116
Indeed, in 2002 the U.S. imposed steel tariffs that likely cost more jobs
than it saved. See David E. Rosenbaum, They Support Free Trade, Except in the
Case of .... N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, Sec. 4, at 3.
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comes, and each system has its own strengths and weaknesses."1
92

A key weakness of winner take all systems (the predominant mode
of representation in the U.S.) is that a stable, entrenched majority
may completely ignore the preferences of the minority. While
some theorists posit that such stability is unlikely in large polities," 8 certain characteristics such as race119may lead to enduring
coalitions and a "tyranny of the majority."
B. Process Failure
Externalities and inadequate information are commonly
accepted causes of market failure.' 20 When these problems occur
government intervention may be justified as a means of correcting
inefficient resource allocation. Public choice theory, however,
raises the possibility that these same problems may occur within
government, resulting in the same misallocation. In particular, two
forms of government failure may result in super-optimal pollution
and environmental injustice. First, the poor may lack the resources
necessary to overcome collective action and information problems
such that their preferences are not adequately represented in the
siting process. Second, although pollution may be regulated at a
jurisdictional level at which all harms could be internalized, 12 1 defects in the political process may result in "internalities." Subgroups within the jurisdiction, including "discrete and insular minorities,' 122 may receive inefficient protection. 123
1. The Poor and the Lack of Political Capital

See TULLOCK ET AL., supra note 117, at 22-27 (describing some basic
electoral paradoxes).
118
See id. at 33.
119
See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 4-8 (1994).
120
See, e.g., SAMUELSON & NORDHUAS, supra note 38, at 272.
117

121

This is the principle of subsidiarity.

122

U.S.v. CaroleneProducts,304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
See Mancur Olson, Jr., Strategic Theory and Its Applications - The

123

Principleof "FiscalEquivalence": The Division of ResponsibilitiesAmong Different Levels of Government, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 479, 482 (1969); Daniel Esty,
Revitalizing EnvironmentalFederalism,95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 589 (1996).
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Critics of NIMBYism often depict the siting process as a
classic collective action dilemma. A small group of intensely interested citizens successfully block a project that would benefit society. Those residents that live near a facility will suffer a relatively
high level of harm, making it rational for them to actively engage
in the siting process. The public at large will benefit more than the
NIMBY advocates are harmed, but the stake for any individual is
too small to justify political participation. The result is a "siting
crisis" in24which beneficial facilities become nearly impossible to
1
develop.
The problem with this standard account is that it overlooks
the most intensely interested group in any siting process: the developer. Within the broader collective action dilemma lies another.
The developer of a facility has the most to gain in any siting process, and does not face a collective action dilemma. The developer
will typically be organized as a corporation, operating under a hierarchical model that limits transaction costs. In addition, the developer will possess the most information about the project, and
will often have experience in the siting process.
Members of the local opposition will have a comparatively
limited stake in the siting process. Residents will face substantial
transaction costs in any attempt to organize. They will often be unfamiliar with the regulatory process, and have limited technical
ability. Overcoming the collective action dilemma requires "heroic
25
effort."'

1

Residents attempting to organize opposition to a proposed
LULU do have advantages over other types of interest groups. For
example, they usually live in a discrete geographic area, making it
easier to identify and contact potential allies. Indeed, NIMBYism
is commonly effective. One study of hazardous waste facility siting
found approximately one-quarter of projects were stopped and half
26
were delayed. 1
124

See Donna L. Kolar, PracticalAdvice for Permittinga Waste Disposal

Facility, 4 Nat. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 11, 11 (1989) (claiming that the "NIMBY
syndrome is in large measure responsible for the waste disposal crisis in this
country.").
125
Brion, supra note 116, at 452.
126
See WALTER A. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY
(1991).
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Importantly, not all communities come to the table with
equal tools to fight a LULU. Recognizing this fact, rational developers actively seek out communities that are less able to impose
costs on developers through NIMBY activism. Some studies suggest that the political participation level of a community is tied to
the likelihood of a LULU being sited there. 127 Participation requires significant resources. Denis Brion provides a useful taxonomy of participation resources. First, there are those resources that
enable participation, such as time, negotiating skill, and an understanding of the political process. Second, there are resources that
provide the substance
of participation, which primarily comprises
128
information.
Like most other valuable commodities, the poor are less
likely to possess participatory resources. A consultant advising the
California Waste Management Board on the siting of three proposed incinerators made this point bluntly:
Certain types of people are likely to participate in
politics, either by virtue of their issue awareness or
their financial resources, or both. Members of middle or higher-socioeconomic strata (a composite index of level of education, occupational prestige, and
income) are more likely to organize into effective
groups to express their political interests and views.
All socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the
nearby siting of major facilities, but the middle and
upper-socioeconomic strata possess better resources
to effectuate their opposition. Middle and highersocioeconomic strata neighborhoods should not fall
at least within the
one mile and five mile radii of the
1 29
proposed site.
127

See Vicki Been, Analyzing the Evidence of EnvironmentalJustice, 11 J.

LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 5-6 (1995) (summarizing these studies).
128
See Brion, supra note 116, at 444-45. Brion notes that these resources
can either be developed by individuals involved in a siting controversy, or purchased from others, such as professional lobbyists, but in either case are expensive. Id.
129
J. STEPHEN POWELL, CERRELL ASSOCIATES, POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES
FACING WASTE TO ENERGY CONVERSION PLANT SITING, REPORT TO THE CALl-
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Developers adopt a "path of least resistance" approach that
exacerbates environmental injustice because community poverty is
a readily ascertainable proxy for political powerlessness. In the
market for legislation, or specific administrative outcomes, the
suppliers are government officials. Those with fewer resources are
systematically less able to "buy" their preferred outcomes because
they lack the political capital. Accordingly, the poor are less able
to impose costs on LULU developers.
A number of factors limit the ability of the poor to compete
effectively in the siting process. First, the poor simply have less
time to invest in political activity. The "hierarchy of needs theory"
suggests that individuals spend time on basic needs before paying
attention to other matters. 30 For those whose time is all but monopolized by work, transportation, and child care, attending a rezoning hearing-even if it might be an effective method of opposition-is out of the question. 31 Even if an individual does find time
for political involvement, she may devote that time to other issues
such as education or housing policies that seem more pressing. 132
Second, the poor obviously lack money. Many of the avenues for participation discussed in Section II.B require expert assistance. For example, challenging an environmental impact statement can be an effective way of blocking, or at least imposing
costly delays, on a proposed facility. Taking such action requires
hiring legal counsel, which in almost every case will be costly.
Similarly, attempting to sway decisionmakers concerning the costs
and benefits of a highly technical LULU will often require consultation with specialized experts.
Third, the poor are less likely to possess informal contacts
with decision makers. Many of the discretionary functions involved in the siting process are conducted informally. For exam42-43 (1984), quoted in Been, Fairness,
supra note 29, Fairness,at 1002-03 n.6.
130
Eleanor N. Metzger, Driving the Environmental Justice Movement
FORNIA WASTE MANAGEMENT BOARD

Forward:The Needfor a PaternalisticApproach, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 379,
385.
131
See note 100, supra.
132
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice", 87 Nw. U.L.
REV. 787,824 (1992).
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ple, state siting boards while not overtly political may be influenced by informal contacts with state officials.' 33 Wealthier individuals are better positioned
to hold and exploit informal contacts
134
leaders.
with local
Fourth, the most important resource limitations facing poor
communities attempting to block a LULU concern information.
The poor often lack two types of information. Tracking Brion's
participation resources classification, the first type of information
is that concerning the workings of the political process. Like the
three resources already discussed, it enables participation. The
typical siting decision involves decisionmakers at various levels of
government.' 35 An understanding of how this process works is a
necessity for those seeking to effect its outcome. The poor often
possess limited education and political engagement skills, making
it difficult for them to identify decisionmakers, the processes they
will employ, or the types of information they may find persuasive.
The other type of information is that which forms the substance of participation. The costs of processing such information in
the environmental law context are typically high. 136 A lack of education among the poor is particularly relevant in dealing with the
complex issues surrounding a LULU. Issues of risk, safety, and
mitigation are often presented in a technical manner, which makes
them inaccessible to the average low income resident. 137 The environmental impact statements prepared under NEPA, or state "little
NEPAs" are particularly egregious in this regard. The typical report is hundreds of pages long and is "written in jargon that is often hard to understand, even for those with some technical train-

Godsil, supra note 79, at 405.
See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 15, at 100 (describing the informal
contacts used by business leaders to effect the siting process).
135
Supra Part II.B.
136
Lazarus, supra note 134, at 824 (describing environmental debates as
133
134

"invariably highly technical and complex").
137
See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 1, at 41 (describing the use of technical language at a public hearing).
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ing.' ' 138 Individuals impacted by environmental injustice will have
difficulty understanding much less engaging in such debates.
The notion that the poor are less able to effectuate their
preferences in the political process is well covered by the environmental justice literature. Understanding these issues as a subset of
the collective action dilemmas faced by any community targeted
for a LULU, however, informs the environmental justice debate in
several ways. First, it provides an unambiguous rationale for intervention. Just as LULU siting laws are required by the collective
action and transaction cost dilemmas granting polluters a suboptimal advantage over residents, intervention to address environmental injustice is required to counteract those same dilemmas
within the regulatory process. It is uncontroversial to assert that
government intervention is justified to correct market failures, and
uncompensated pollution is the classic market failure. Understanding environmental justice through a public choice lens extends that
intervention rationale to the regulatory process. When the poor are
systematically unable to impose costs on LULU developers because of collective action and information problems, a market failure is occurring. The fact that the "market" in this case is the political process does not alter the analysis. Similarly, the fact that
some communities are able to overcome this collective action dilemma does not lessen the dilemma for communities that cannot.
Second, viewing environmental justice in this way hones in
on the problem. Not every LULU siting should be a cause of concem. Although collective action and information problems exist in
virtually any siting process, many communities are able to overcome them. 139 Inefficient siting is likely to occur only where the
host community faces additional disadvantages, like those related
to poverty. It is only these cases that require additional government

138

James S. Freeman & Rachel D. Godsil, The Question of Risk. Incorpo-

rating Community PerceptionsInto Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547, 557 (1994).

139

See note 123 and accompanying text. While some poor communities
have been able to successfully block LULUs, see CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (ROBERT BULLARD ed.,

SOUTH END PRESS 1993) (recounting several successful community struggles),
poor communities remain generally less well positioned to defend their interests.
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action. The fact that such communities are actively targeted by facility developers suggests that these problems are widespread.
Finally, recognizing that environmental justice is part of a
regulatory failure counters an argument advanced by skeptics of
the environmental justice movement. Some scholars suggest that
even if environmentally sensitive land uses are distributed in an
uneven fashion, it may simply represent the rational functioning of
the regulatory system. Lynn Blais argues that a poor community's
choice to remain uninformed may be perfectly rational, because
information is costly. 40 This line echoes the optimistic view of
pluralist politics; individuals will participate in the political process
in rough proportion to their interest, leading to generally efficient
outcomes. In this context, the argument suggests that individuals
have a willingness to pay for certain regulatory outcomes. If that
willingness is constrained by ability to pay that is not necessarily a
problem, utility is still maximized because the LULU is placed in
the community with the lowest willingness to pay, and therefore
with the lowest utility for avoiding it. The preceding Section demonstrates, however, that regulatory failure prevents individuals
from effectuating their preferences. Just as few would suggest that
steel tariffs must be efficient because society's preferences were
accurately determined by various groups' willingness to pay for
that legislation, few should be persuaded by the skeptics' argument.
2. Minorities and the Tyranny of the Majority
While race is correlated with poverty, there is an additional
form of process failure that directly impacts minority groups. Under a majority-rules system, a majority coalition may effectively
lock the minority out of the benefits of government. 14 1 This "tyranny of the majority" has two potential negative consequences.
First, as a matter of distributive justice, it may simply be unfair to

140

Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C.L. REV.

75, 130 (1996).
141

See MUELLER, supra note 112, at 142.
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the members of the minority. 142 Imagine a municipality divided
into seven equally populated districts. If this municipality decides
to site seven LULUs it seems intuitively fair that each district
should get one LULU. However, a coalition of four districts may
band together, and site all seven LULUs in the three non-coalition
districts.
In a well-functioning democracy, however, it is unlikely
that such a coalition can remain stable for long. 143 A given polity
will involve a multitude of issues, providing numerous bargaining
chips between districts. With the potential for "logrolling," or vote
trading, each rational member of the minority coalition will be
tempted to join the non-coalition members if they offer a slightly
sweeter deal. The expected result is a constantly shifting series of
alliances in which each district receives approximately equal bene144
fits over time.
This type of pluralist give-and-take may break down in a
particular situation: where "discrete and insular" minorities are
concerned. 145 In his path-breaking book, Democracy and Distrust,
John Hart Ely notes that irrational prejudice may prevent groups
from joining coalitions with such minorities. 46 As a result of this
irrational prejudice, minority groups will not be a part of any of the
shifting coalitions, and will be systematically disadvantaged no
matter who is in power. While some scholars have challenged
Ely's theory, 14 7 this article takes for granted that it holds at least
48
some explanatory power. 1
While the potential unfairness of perennially disadvantaging minority groups is troubling, there is a second drawback of the
142

See Been, Fairness,supra note 29, at 1028-46 (discussing this type of

fairness in environmental justice debate).
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See TULLOCK ET AL., supra note 117, at 33.
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See id.

The phrase derives from the famous footnote 4 of United States. v.
CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77 (1980).
147
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L.
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REV. 713, 723 (1985) (arguing that discrete and insular minorities may be over-

represented in the political process).
14s
Ely's work is the subject of a wide array of scholarly comment. For a
good sampling, see Symposium, Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77
VA. L. REV. 631 (1991).
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"tyranny of the majority." A group that is consistently unable to
enter the pluralist bargaining arena will not have its concerns adequately considered in the decision-making process. Such a group,
although technically a part of the decision-making jurisdiction, will
have no more impact on the outcome of that process than a group
outside the jurisdiction. While negative externalities that flow outside a jurisdiction are well-recognized as leading to inefficient outcomes, negative "internalities" have
not been directly addressed in
49
the environmental justice debate. 1
Returning to the hypothetical municipality discussed above
illustrates this point. Imagine that, rather than deciding where to
site a potential LULU, the municipality was deciding whether to
accept a LULU. The benefit of the LULU is an increase in tax
revenue of $10,000 and the harm is $12,000 in air pollution damage. In an ideally functioning political process the project will be
rejected; its net result is $2,000 of harm to society. On the other
hand, if the municipality can locate the LULU on their border, so
that $11,000 of the air pollution damage occurs in a neighboring
town, they will accept the project, since they still receive all
$10,000 of benefit, but suffer only $1,000 of the costs. This is a
straightforward example of the externality problem.
Imagine now that this municipality, still composed of seven
districts, contains one district that is predominantly populated by a
racial minority, while the other six districts are composed mostly
of members of the racial majority. Such a scenario is hardly farfetched; racial segregation in American cities remains at a high
level. 50 If the representative of the minority district is unable to
periodically join majority coalitions, the costs imposed on residents of that district will not be considered in the municipality's
calculus. The six other districts, constituting an entrenched majorFor a description of the internality concept, see Mancur Olson, Jr., Strategic Theory and Its Applications - The Principle of "FiscalEquivalence": The
Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of Government, 59 AM.
ECON. REV. 479, 482 (1969); and Daniel Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 589 (1996).
150
See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 66-67 (1993) (noting that "dissimilarity index," a measure of racial segregation, of American cities have changed only slightly since the 1970s).
149
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ity coalition, will calculate the net effects of the LULU only among
the coalition members. If the harms caused by the LULU are localized within the minority district, that calculus suggests moving
forward with the project even though it causes net harm within the
technical bounds of the jurisdiction. The analysis is comparable to
the externality problem, the only difference is that those harmed by
the LULU internalities are, de jure, part of the decision-making
process.
These simplified examples are not meant to actually represent the political process. Very few lawmakers are vehemently racist enough to literally refuse to bargain with representatives of minority communities. Instead, such discrimination is likely to mirror
that which takes place in society at large. As Lani Guinier notes,
the election of representatives of minority communities "may simply transfer the 'discrete and insular minority' problem from the
polling place to the ... legislative council."'15' Minority representatives may face a variety of marginalizing tactics, from overt exclusion to ostensibly neutral 52rules that prevent them from realizing
pluralist bargaining gains.1
Because racial minorities are often confined to specific
geographic areas within a jurisdiction, internalities are particularly
likely. By definition, the harms of a LULU are localized. If a group
is dispersed throughout a jurisdiction it would be difficult to impose harms upon them without also harming majority coalition
members. It is relatively simple to limit the impact of a hazardous
waste dump, for example, to a racial minority by locating it in the
center of an overwhelmingly minority neighborhood. This practice
is bolstered by the fact that political representation is determined
geographically. That is, LULU costs can not only be limited to a
specific minority group, but can also be confined to a single representative's district. If LULU harms effected multiple legislator's
constituents, it would be more difficult maintain a stable coalition.
These localized effects make internalities so likely in the
LULU context that they sometimes occur even without the irrational prejudice usually linked to racial status. In New York City
151

GUIN IER supra note 121, at 75.
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102 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL 13
for example, Staten Island is home to the Fresh Kills Landfill, the
longtime recipient of the City's solid waste. Staten Island residents
are the epitome of "discrete and insular;" the Island is connected to
the rest of New York by only one bridge, and the Borough tends to
vote Republican in the strongly Democratic City. Despite relatively high levels of income and home ownership (usually good
indicators of political efficacy), Staten Island residents complain of
being treated
as a "dumping ground for the City's undesirable fa153
cilities."'
Once again, understanding this mechanism of environmental injustice as a regulatory failure provides a clear rationale
for regulating it. Just as the externalities created by a polluting facility justify government intervention in the market, internalities in
the political process require regulatory attention. As with the process failures related to poverty, irrational prejudice in the political
process may lead to super-optimal levels of pollution.
IV. POTENTIAL INEFFICIENCIES

An ideally functioning system, based on either entitlements or
regulation, will reach a pollution level at which the marginal cost
of pollution is equal to the marginal benefits, while limiting administrative costs. Administrative costs have rendered an entitlement
regime for LULUs impracticable. The regulatory regime we have
adopted instead aims to reach the optimal level of pollution
through the political process, which can be thought of as a market
for regulatory outcomes. The process failures related to environmental injustice, however, may systematically produce superoptimal levels of pollution. While several scholars have noted the
potential for NIMBYism to block projects that are socially inefficient, 154 none have systematically examined how the inability of
some groups to mount successful NIMBY campaigns may lead to
153
See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan
Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of
Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 784, 831 n. 253 (1992).
154

See, e.g., Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmental In-

equity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 216-17;
O'HARE ET AL., supra note 107, at 67.
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inefficient siting. 155 In this Part I detail how these process failures
may lead to super-optimal levels of pollution.
The basic notion underlying this analysis is that externalities, whether in the market or in politics, will lead to inefficiency.
Efficiency does not necessarily require actual payments from LULUs owners to those harmed by them. Since the administrative
costs of such a system would be exceedingly high, a valid substitute is to regulate. If individuals' preferences are correctly conglomerated by the political process, rules governing the siting and
operation of LULUs can lead to optimal results.' 56 If, however, the
preferences of some are ignored (or more accurately, diluted) in
the political process, those preferences are effectively externalities.
Environmental injustice is an example of the political externality
phenomena and the result is LULU regulation that results in too
many, or poorly located LULUs.
There are three means by which environmental justice may
lead to inefficiencies. First, if a portion of an activity's external
costs are not considered in the political process, we are likely to
observe that activity occurring at an inefficiently high level. Second, if LULU operators are forced to pay most of their transportation costs, but not the costs of environmental harms they cause,
they are likely to locate their facilities at inefficient locations.
155

One author notes, in passing, that "[i]f poor communities and commu-

nities of color are ill-equipped to bargain effectively with developers, . . . some
LULUs may be sited improperly because host communities are unable to effectively force developers to internalize the social costs of their projects." Seth D.
Jaffe, Market Perspectives: The Market's Response to Environmental Inequity:
We Have the Solution; What's the Problem?, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 655, 656
(1995). Besides Jaffe, Vicki Been comes closest to recognizing the potential
inefficiencies that may be caused by environmental injustice. She notes that
many environmental justice advocates demand cost internalization which would
result in "greater efficiency, and greater efficiency is likely to mean fewer LULUs." Been, Fairness,supra note 29, at 1055.
156
An obvious counterargument is that the political process is not governed by an actual market and so the outcomes it produces are unlikely to actually be efficient. While I am certainly not arguing that government regulations
will reach efficient results, I do suggest that a properly functioning political
process will. There are certainly other forms of process failure than those that I
describe here. The existence of other process defects does not make these particular defects any less deserving of correction, or any less likely to distort the
process in an inefficient manner.
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Third, if the government is not properly considering the harms to
some communities, they are likely to engage in inefficient remediation of old sites.
A. Inefficient Activity Levels
Steven Shavell, in exploring strict liability and negligence
standards for tort liability, raised the importance of "activity levels." Under a negligence standard, individuals who meet some
level of care are freed from liability for harm that their activity
may cause. For example, a driver would not be liable for an accident if he were driving non-negligently. If the negligence standard
is set so that the marginal costs of taking of extra care equal the
marginal safety benefits such a system would appear to be efficient. The problem is that individuals may engage in sub-optimal
activity levels, that is, people will drive more than is socially efficient because they do not pay for the incremental harm of5 7each trip
(the risk of an accident) as long as they are not negligent.'
This insight has an analog in the environmental justice
realm. When LULU operators pay for the harms that they cause
through neither the market nor through regulation, they will engage
in super-optimal activity levels. Hazardous waste disposal facilities
provide a ready example of this phenomenon. Since the harms inflicted upon poor and minority communities are not adequately
internalized by the operators of the facilities, they are able to offer
their services at lower rates. Consumers of products that generate
such waste do not bear the full costs of disposal and therefore consume inefficiently high levels of such products. A properly functioning system would force the costs of harm done to poor and minority communities into this calculus so that consumers would be
incentivized to reduce consumption and industry would be incentivized to adopt production processes that
produce less waste, in
58
turn leading to fewer disposal facilities.'

157
(1980).
158
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Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
See Been, Fairness,supra note 29, at 1055-56 (discussing this exam-
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This example also demonstrates the commensurability of
market and government control mechanisms. The legal system
could directly internalize costs, by entitling residents to be free
from hazardous waste spillovers and imposing liability on facilities
that violate those entitlements, or it could rely on regulation by taxing such facilities or imposing technology requirements aimed at
mitigating spillovers. 159 Whether the costs are imposed through the
market or through regulation, the operators of such facilities are
properly incentivized because they pay the true costs of their activities. Inefficient activity levels due to market externalities are
replicated in the regulation context when the costs imposed on
poor and minority communities are not fully considered, so that
taxes are sub-optimal, or technology requirements are too lenient.
The magnitude of this distortion is heavily affected by two
variables. First is the extent to which poor and minority community concerns are diluted by the political process. The greater the
gap between the actual preferences of poor and minority communities and the consideration of those preferences in the political process, the greater the gap will be between efficient and actual activity
levels. Second is the prevalence of LULUs in poor and minority
communities. We would expect that an industry that is located exclusively in poor and minority communities would face less costly
regulation than an industry in 0which only 10% of facilities are located in such neighborhoods.16
The impacts of environmental justice, therefore, stretch beyond the distribution of hazardous waste disposal facilities. Process failure results in higher than optimal levels of hazardous waste
generation. This effect is replicated through a number of industries
that benefit from a regulatory process that does not fully consider
the interests of poor and minority communities resulting in inefficient pollution. If air pollution from electricity-generation, for example, included the full costs of harm done to poor and minority
communities, consumers would use less power, and industry would
Assume that the tax rate is equal to the harm such facilities cause, and
that the technology requirement sets the marginal benefits of the technology at
its marginal cost.
160
Indeed, a National Law Journal report found lower EPA penalties in
minority communities. See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 14.
159
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be incentivized to invest in electricity-conserving products. The
impact of environmental injustice is felt across the entire economy,
not just in host communities, through inefficiently high activity
levels.
Finally, while activity levels exist on a continuum, it should
be noted that some activities may not take place at all if the preferences of poor and minority communities were taken into account;
that is, the activity level would be zero. Under circumstances in
which a process imposes costs almost exclusively on a community
that faces extraordinarily large political obstacles, environmental
costs would be utterly ignored. If these costs were high enough, the
activity may be inefficient at any level, especially if potential substitutes exist.
B. Inefficient Location
Transportation costs are an important consideration for
most industries, but are especially important for hazardous waste
facilities. 161 Access to major highways and proximity to industrial
customers are often cited as ostensibly neutral factors that may
lead to inequitable distribution of hazardous waste TSDFs. 162 Both
of these factors provide TSDF operators incentives to locate in
relatively high population density areas. Industrial facilities and
major highways are obviously located near the people they serve in
order to minimize transportation costs.
Regulation largely ignores population density in the permitting process. RCRA's technology standards apply regardless of the
location of a facility. 163 The Clean Air Act only indirectly considers population density, by imposing stricter regulations on facilities
in non-attainment areas, 64 which contain higher levels of ambient
161

Transportation of hazardous waste is regulated by the EPA under

RCRA. See notes 53-62, supra, and accompanying text.
162
See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 15, at 72-73 (noting that proximity to
transportation routes may lead to environmental injustice because freeways are
disproportionately located in minority communities); Been & Gupta, supra note
29, at 23 ([O]ne would expect TSDFs to locate near their customers, which tend
to be manufacturing and industrial facilities.").
163
See notes 55-62, supra, and accompanying text.
164
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7514a (2000).
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pollution, and accordingly are more likely to contain higher population densities. This site neutrality does not force operators of polluting facilities to consider the number of people that will be
harmed by their activities. Since the number of people impacted by
a polluting facility is directly proportional to the level of harm it
may cause, polluters
will locate in inefficiently high population
65
density areas.'
Vicki Been notes that facility developers do have some incentive to take population density into account. As population density increases, the number of potential NIMBY opponents also
rises. 166 The rational facility operator will therefore avoid high
population areas because they are more likely to have the ability to
impose costs on the facility through delay, litigation, and poor publicity. As Part III explains, however, not all communities are able
to impose these costs. When poor and minority communities are
unable to overcome the obstacles to fighting a LULU, the developer is not forced to consider the harm done to that community.
Environmental injustice results in LULUs being sited in areas with
high population densities, when the socially optimal result would
be to locate them in sparsely populated areas.
C. Inefficient Remediation
Many hazardous waste sites were located before the rise of
the modem environmental law framework. 167 Cleanup of many of
these older sites is governed by CERCLA. The cost-benefit rationale for CERCLA is straightforward: uncontrolled toxic waste sites
are causing harm to nearby communities in excess of the costs of
cleaning them up. It is therefore socially efficient to remediate
68
these harms. 1
165

See Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance

Law to Effect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 491 (1997) (arguing
that pollution laws do not adequately consider location incentives and suggesting that nuisance law may fill this regulatory gap).
I(A
See Been & Gupta, supra note 29, at 23.
167
See Been & Gupta, supra note 29, at 32 (suggesting that pre-1970 sitIg may be responsible for distributional inequities in TSDF siting).
168
There is much controversy surrounding who pays for these cleanups,
and how clean the sites must be made, but these debates are beyond the scope of
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Many of these sites are located in poor and minority communities. 1 69 Central cities in particular, with their large poor and
minority populations, are disproportionately impacted by these
sites.170 Due to the process failures described in Part III, some of
these sites will likely not be cleaned up even if it would be socially
efficient to do so, or will be cleaned up at an inefficiently slow
pace.
A key finding of the National Law Journal Study was that
17
superfund cleanups did take longer in minority communities.
Additionally, the tax that financed the superfund was allowed to
expire in 1995, so that the trust fund is slowly being depleted despite the presence of over 1,500 sites.' 72 Because many of these
sites are located in communities that are unable to enforce their
preferences in the political process, cleanup of old and abandoned
sites is likely to occur at a suboptimal level.
Understanding this problem through the process failure lens
is especially important because it renders irrelevant the chicken or
the egg controversy.' 73 Whether poor and minority groups coalesced around these abandoned sites, or were targeted by the original developers of the sites, does not matter if the goal is to reach an
efficient level of remediation. Understanding the non-distributive
impact of environmental injustice removes the topic from the pothis paper. One particularly poignant example is the controversy surrounding
brownfield plans which would allow economically struggling localities to opt
for lower cleanup standards in an effort to boost economic development. Scholars are split on whether this is beneficial or harmful for poor communities. See,
e.g., Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate and Unequal, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1

(1996) (opposing to brownfield plans); Kristin H. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives
and Environmental Justice, 13 J. NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 317 (1998) (supporting).
169
The United Church of Christy study found that 60% of black and Latino Americans live in a community with an uncontrolled toxic waste site. See
UCC Study, supra note 13, at xiv.
170
See Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste
Cleanup, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 671, 672 (1994).
171
See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 14.
172
The EPA's CERCLIS database listed 1,546 sites as of November 10,
2005.
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CFTOKEN=87443988.
173
See notes 29-30, supra.
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litically explosive mode of finding a villain, or intentional racism.
The point should not be to find a party responsible for the problem;
it should be to clean up sites when it makes economic sense to do
SO.
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS VIEWED THROUGH THE EFFICIENCY
LENS

In this Part, I examine how potential solutions to environmental
injustice would affect the inefficient allocation of pollution. Scholars and legislators have developed a broad array of responses to
environmental injustice. These proposals fall into three categories.
First, the "equal protection model" requires regions to accept a fair
share of pollution. Second, the "due process model" calls for increased public participation in the siting process. Third, the "property model" attempts to internalize the harms of a LULU by requiring some form of compensation. While the merits of these proposals have been extensively debated along a distributional axis, my
goal here is to examine them with respect to allocative efficiency.
A. The Equal Protection Model
Under the equal protection model, LULUs are distributed
between communities on an equal basis. Perhaps the most famous
example is New York City's "fair share" rule, 174 under which city
agencies are required to develop siting guidelines that will ensure
an equal distribution of burdens and benefits among the city's
communities. While initially haled as a major step forward by environmental justice advocates, the rule has been bogged down by
years of agency recalcitrance. The Department of Sanitation, for
example, took eight years to develop guidelines that one commentator decried as "predictably toothless and riddled with exemp75
tions."1
174
175

N.Y.C.C. § 203(a) (2005).
John McCrory, The First Regional Government Still Cries for Plan-

ning: The Case of Waste Management, Planner's Network Newsletter,
Mar./Apr. 1998. The Commissioner of the department conceded that the rules
would not prevent a concentration of city facilities, but noted that zoning rules
severely constrained the department. Id.
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Far more common than explicit equal distribution laws are
rules that forbid the concentration of LULUs. The Arkansas Code,
for example, establishes a presumption against siting a high-impact
7 6
solid waste facility within twelve miles of an existing facility.1
The presumption can only be overcome if there is no other suitable
location in a region, or if the local community accepts the site in a
compensation agreement. 177 The law is directly aimed at mitigating
environmental injustice; the legislative intent section notes the
"tendency to concentrate high impact solid waste disposal facilities
in lower-income or minority communities" and expressly aims to
limit such concentrations.' 78
Both approaches focus on the distribution of LULUs, but
could lead to efficient outcomes in a roundabout way. As Justice
Jackson noted, "there is no more effective practical guaranty
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority
must be imposed generally."' 9 The principal, when applied to
LULU siting, suggests that inefficient siting will not occur in poor
or minority neighborhoods if wealthier white neighborhoods would
be forced to accept the same burdens. In other words, the process
failures that plague effective opposition to a LULU in poor and
minority communities would not matter if these communities could
free ride on the LULU opposition of wealthier communities. Equal
distribution laws would allow free-riding because the burdens of
LULUs would be spread evenly on all members of society.
Unfortunately, equal distribution laws face a number of
practical difficulties. First, there is a significant commensurability
problem both amongst and between types of LULUs. It is unclear
how one would measure, for example, land fill distribution. Would
each neighborhood be forced to host one landfill, receive an equal
share of a region's waste, or be responsible for disposing of their
own waste?'? ° These measurement problems become more diffi176

ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1504 (2000).

177
178
179

Id.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-6-1501(2005).
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-113
(1949) (concurring).
180
See Been, Fairness, supra note 29, at 1034 (discussing various measurement problems with equal distribution approaches).
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cult for LULUs that impose high levels of risk for the surrounding
community. Is a nuclear power plant, with a small risk of catastrophic harm, comparable to a coal-fired power plant with an almostcertain chance of some harm? As this example indicates, comparison between varying types of LULUs is even more fraught with
uncertainty.
Second, economies of scale often make a small number of
large LULUs more efficient than a large number of small facilities.
It would be drastically inefficient to have hundreds of tiny power
plants dotting a state, rather than the relatively few large power
plants currently in existence. Focusing solely on distribution could
lead to severe inefficiencies.
A possible solution to this problem would be to focus on
ex-ante, rather than ex-post equality; that is, give every community
an equal chance of hosting a LULU, rather than each community
actually hosting one. Such a lottery system, however, presupposes
that each community has an equally suitable site for each type of
LULU. Legitimate site characteristics, such as geology, hydrology,
and seismology, make some sites objectively better than others.
Employing a suitability-blind lottery would lead to inefficient or
even irrational outcomes, but giving a decision maker discretion
will inevitably lead to political pressure
and the same process fail8
ures that plague the current system. ' '
The final and perhaps most problematic issue with equal
distribution approaches is that it fails to account for preferences.
While skeptics of the environmental justice movement tend to
overstate the point, 82 the fact remains that poor and minority
communities may indeed have differing preferences for the envi83
ronmental harm/fiscal-benefit tradeoff many LULUs involve.'
While such apparent preferences are often the result of market and
181

See Been, Fairness,supra note 29, at 1032-33 (noting the politicking

behind the development of site criteria in the radioactive waste disposal debate).
182
Roy Whitehead, Jr. & Walter Block, EnvironmentalJustice Risks in the
Petroleum Industry, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 67, 86 (2000).
(For example, one writer notes that poor and minority residents "vote with their
feet" by moving towards LULUs, and suggests that they "are saying 'if this is
environmental racism, we want more of it.").
183
See Blais, supra note 32, at 104-115 (for a description of the benefits
some communities may seek in exchange for a LULU).
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political failures, a process free of such defects may still locate
LULUs in a non-equal manner. 184 A system concerned with efficient siting will maximize social utility, and will have to take such
preferences into account.
The equal protection model of LULU siting will be
unlikely to increase the efficiency of the siting process. While a
properly functioning system of this type could, in theory, defeat the
process failures that result in environmental injustice, practical
problems of measurement and scale would likely overwhelm any
efficiency gains. Additionally, an equal distribution system would
not consider actual community preferences, and therefore would be
unable to allocate LULUs in a manner that maximizes social utility.
B. The Due Process Model
Unlike the equal protection model, the due process model
attempts to tackle the environmental justice problem directly. As
previously noted, environmental injustice is a result of LULU operators failing to internalize the costs they impose on poor and minority communities. This failure occurs both in the market and in
the political process. Whereas the property model attempts to internalize those costs through the market, the due process model
attempts to force LULU operators to consider those costs through
the political process.
While scholars have proposed a broad array of due process
model solutions to the environmental injustice problem, I divide
them into two general categories. First, the forced consideration
model would require decision makers to consider the environmental justice effects of siting decisions. Second, the public participation model would grant individuals and communities increased opportunities to take part in the siting decision.
1. Forced Consideration

184

See infra Part V.C. (examination of moral objections to compensated

siting proposals).
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Executive Order 12,898 is the primary example of the
forced-consideration approach. The order requires that "each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its
mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects
of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations
15
and low-income populations in the United States ....
The idea behind Executive Order 12,898 is relatively simple: Requiring agencies to consider the environmental justice impacts of their decisions will lead to more just outcomes. Gerald
Torres suggests that "agencies could construct ways to harness
these new sources of information to shape them into coherent recommendations for both assessing and distributing 86the burdens of
our industrial society in a more equitable fashion."'
From an efficiency perspective, forcing agencies to consider the actual costs of LULUs in poor and minority communities
could provide a perfect solution to the process failures outlined
above. Agencies would be tipped off to potential public choice
problems when they find that a siting decision would have significant environmental justice effects. The agency could then apply a
more searching analysis of the costs of a LULU to compensate for
that process failure.
The shortcomings of Executive Order 12,898 reveal the
major flaws behind a forced-consideration approach. Although
agencies are required to include an analysis of environmental justice in their impact statements, they need not grant that analysis
any particular weight in their decision. Scholars have levied similar
complaints against the National Environmental Policy Act's requirement that agencies prepare environmental impact statements.187 Even worse, the actual analysis is often less than satisfactory. 188

185

Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).

186

Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21

FORDHAM URB. L. J. 431, 455 (1994).

The debate over the procedural focus of NEPA is beyond the scope of
this paper, however, the two classic works on the topic are Joseph L. Sax, The
(Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239, 239, 245-48 (1973)
(criticizing) and SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVI187
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The procedural focus of impact statements allows agencies
to create pro forma reports, and grant them only lip service. They
may provide residents fighting a LULU with another avenue to attack the project, but the incentive to challenge such assessments
are limited. Even where an assessment is found to be substandard,
the remedy is merely procedural: the agency must reconsider and
reassess. 189 Additionally, highly technical legal battles are likely to
be unaffordable for most poor communities. The forced consideration approach is therefore unlikely to significantly mitigate the inefficiencies caused by environmental injustice.
2. Public participation
The due process model alternative to forced consideration
is increasing the ability of the public to participate in the siting
process. Many environmental justice advocates focus on procedural aspects of the siting decision. Activists insist on a "place at
the table" where the siting decisions will be made. 90 Luke Cole
and Sheila Foster highlight the transformative effects of empowering communities that often feel disenfranchised to "speak for
themselves" in environmental justice disputes.' 91
In addition to the political benefits to poor and minority
communities, increasing participation may lead to greater efficiency in the siting process. Barriers to participation in the siting
process are a key component of the process failure that results in
inefficient siting. Participation in the technical and legalistic siting
process imposes significant costs on individuals attempting to influence its outcome. These costs act as a direct barrier by prevent-

RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

(1984) (supporting).
188
See Walsh & Shrader-Frechette, supra note 21, at 533-34 (discussing
the apparently contradictory environmental justice impact statements completed
by the Department of Energy).
189
See In the Matter of Louisiana Energy Services L.P., 45 N.R.C. 367
(1997) (finding non-compliance with Executive Order 12,898, but requiring
only further analysis).
190
See Robert R.M. Vechick, The Commerce Clause, EnvironmentalJustice, and the Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1302 (1997).
191

See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 15 at 1, 151-166.
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ing those without adequate resources from participating, and as an
indirect barrier by deepening the collective action problem residents attempting to fight a LULU face. 192 By lowering these costs,
poor and minority residents will be better able to force LULU operators to internalize the costs of siting decisions.
The details of process-based reforms are extremely important. Poorly crafted procedural rules may actually increase environmental injustice. The ability of wealthier communities to wage
more effective NIMBY campaigns is a major contributor to disproportionate siting. LULU developers rationally seek out the path
of least resistance, that is, the communities least able to force them
to internalize costs through delay, litigation, regulatory concessions, or negative publicity. 193 Many avenues for public participation are more open to communities with greater resources. For example, highly technical public hearings will advantage communities that can afford to hire experts or have the educational resources to supply their own testimony. Providing yet another political market in which poor communities will be out-competed by
their wealthier counterparts may worsen the situation by providing
additional incentives for 94LULU developers to single out politically-weak communities. 1
Carefully crafted participation reforms would have the opposite effect. Participatory rules that tend to level the playing field
would remove the incentive to site LULUs disproportionately by
allowing poor and minority communities to impose the same costs
on developers than wealthier communities can. Rules that shift participatory "markets" from advantaging wealthy communities towards resource-neutrality can be very effective. For example,
Deeohn Ferris notes that "Technical Assistance Grants," which
provide communities impacted by Superfund sites funding to hire
technical advisors to educate the community, could be a leveling
program. Poor communities that lack technical expertise and the
192

See supra Part III.B.1.

193

Id.

194

Eileen Gauna discusses the problem of public participation avenues in

the regulatory process disadvantaging poor and minority communities. In particular, she finds advisory committee and notice and comment processes too
technical for many communities to meaningfully participate in. See Eileen
Gauna, The EnvironmentalJustice Misfit, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 57-67 (1998).
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resources to hire a technical advisor could be placed on equal footing with more advantaged communities through such grants. This
would remove significant barriers that prevent poor communities
from forcing LULUs to internalize costs. Instead, the program is
burdened by an extensive and complicated administrative process
that makes it difficult for many communities to receive such
grants. 195 Ferris proposes revisions to the program that would simplify the application process and make
it more responsive to the
96
needs of low income communities.'
Other well-crafted proposals based on the due process
model would create new avenues for participation rather than correcting existing modes. Sean Walsh and Kristin ShraderFrechette's adversarial risk assessment proposal provides an excellent example. 197 Under their plan, communities being targeted for
siting would be granted funding to produce independent risk assessments. This would make "consideration of alternative positions
a requirement of democratic decision making, rather than a luxury
accessible only to those financially able to participate in administrative hearings or legal appeals."' 98 Such funding would assist
low-income residents but would not significantly increase the ability of wealthier communities to fight a LULU, thus mitigating the
efficiency-distorting effects of environmental injustice.
To summarize, the due process model can increase the efficiency of the siting process by lessening the process failures that
make it difficult for poor and minority communities attempting to
fight a LULU. By lessening the costs of participation, some proposals would allow low-income residents to impose the same costs
on a LULU developer that wealthier communities currently impose. This would eliminate the incentive for LULU developers to
seek out a "path of least resistance" by targeting politically-weak
areas for development. The due process model is not without pit195

Deeohn Ferris, Communities of Color and Hazardous Waste Cleanup,

21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 671, 678-679 (1994).

196

See id. at 679-82 (for example, she suggests shortening the 341 page

application handbook, eliminating the requirement that communities produce a
three-year itemized budget, providing instructions in Spanish, and making the
frants payable up-front, rather than as reimbursements).
97
See Walsh & Shrader-Frechette, supra note 19, at 539.
198

Id.
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falls, however. The forced consideration approach may not lead to
real changes in the decision-making process. Additionally, public
participation measures that provide political "markets" in which
wealth gives participants advantages are likely to worsen environmental injustice. To the extent that reforms are well crafted, the
due process model provides a way to lessen the inefficiencies in
the siting process caused by environmental injustice.
C. The Property Model
Where the due process model aims to force LULU operators to consider the harms they inflict on poor and minority communities through the political process, the property model seeks
market internalization. This is perhaps the most direct and theoretically promising way to overcome the externality problemdirectly internalize the costs of harms. Once again, however, the
devil is in the details.
1. Types of Compensation
Compensated siting proposals vary greatly along a number
of axes. First, compensation may be remedial, preventative, or incentive-based. 199 Remedial plans would follow the traditional tort
doctrine of making victims whole; LULU operators would simply
pay for any damages that they cause. Preventative compensation
attempts to mitigate the harm caused by the facility, by, for example, taking additional safety precautions. Incentive-based compensation provides funding in excess of the damages caused in order
to entice a community to host a facility. Remedial plans are
plagued by the same evidentiary and latency problems that make
torts an impracticable alternative to LULU regulation.2 00 Preventative and incentive-based programs offer a better alternative.
199

See Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals:Is It Time to Pay At-

tention?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 792 (1994) (employing this taxonomy);
Mank, supra note 79, at 359-360 (same).
200
See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Pollution-related injuries are
difficult to prove because of scientific uncertainty, numerous sources, and long
latency periods between exposure and discovery of harm.
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Second, the method of compensation varies. Compensation
can be ex-ante, ongoing or ex-post. 20 Ex-ante compensation can
take the form of pre-construction grants to a community. Ongoing
compensation provides benefits to a host community on a continual or iterated basis, for example, annual fees paid to the local government. Ex-post compensation provides payment only after some
harm has occurred, but can also take the form of insurance for such
payments. 20 2 Under an ex-ante program, the potential for information problems to result in inefficient siting is the highest. A potential host community is at a distinct disadvantage in terms of estimating the risks a given facility will pose.20 3 A facility developer
may use her informational advantage to offer a compensation
package less than the amount a fully-informed community would
accept, resulting in market failure. Ex- post compensation, like remedial compensation, suffers from evidentiary and latency problems. Ongoing compensation offers the best alternative for efficient siting because it establishes a repeat player, cooperative relationship between the community and the developer. This relationship allows flexibility should the level of harm change in the future.
Third, the method of determining the level of compensation
can take several forms. Compensation can be based on a statutory
formula, computed by an administrative agency, or negotiated between a community and developer. 20 4 Each method is subject to
potential process failures. Under a statutory or administrative
scheme, the level of compensation may be distorted downward by
See Been, supra note 201, at 792-94; Mank, supra note 79, at 360-62.
Companies may be incentivized to underinsure or undercapitalize so
that catastrophic accidents result in bankruptcy and the avoidance of liability.
See Mank, supra note 79, at 360-62 (noting some evidence that hazardous waste
fmns employ this tactic).
203
See notes 135-139, supra and accompanying text (describing information problems in the siting process).
204
See Been, supra note 201, at 794-95; Mank, supra note 79, at 362-65.
Both Been and Mank add to this list the reverse auction system in which a developer proposes a LULU and raises the compensation package until a community steps forward and a lottery system in which the compensation level is the
amount a government must promise to receive unanimous consent from a randomly selected community. I group both of these procedures under the negotiated compensation heading.
201

202
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the under-participation of poor and minority communities. The
same process failures that occur in the siting process may occur at
the compensation-setting stage. The facility developer, as a small
and intensely interested party, may be able to capture the process.
If representatives assume that many facilities will be located in
poor or minority communities, they may be less incentivized to
fight for higher compensation packages. This latter point may be
offset somewhat in statutory formula programs because the formula will have general applicability. Wealthier communities would
be subject to the same level of compensation, and will therefore
urge a higher level.2 °5 Individualized administrative determinations
would not have this advantage. Negotiated compensation also risks
under-compensation due to process failure. The information and
collective-action problems communities face in fighting a proposed LULU spill over into the negotiation process. Developers
have the upper hand in negotiating with an ill-informed and relatively less-interested community.2 06 Any negotiated compensation
proposal should therefore be20 supplemented
with due process model
7
reinforcement.
participation
Fourth, compensation proposals must consider who actually receives compensation. In most cases compensation would go
to a local government. This method is extremely problematic in
cases where the scope of the harm does not match the jurisdictional
size. Compensating an entire city for the harms inflicted upon a
small part of that city actually worsens the tyranny of the majority
problem. An entrenched majority may make inefficient siting decisions when tax benefits are spread throughout a jurisdiction but
pollution costs are imposed on a localized minority. 20 Similarly, a
jurisdiction may accept inefficient LULUs if compensation is
205

See supra note 181, and accompanying text (describing how laws of

0eneral applicability encourage the majority to treat the minority fairly).
06
See DOUGLAS J. AMY, THE POLrrIcs OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION
132-147 (1987) (describing the advantages of a developer in negotiations).
See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (providing examples

207

of technical assistance grants that would allow communities to overcome informational deficiencies); see also Mank, supra note 79, at 364 (suggesting that
minimum levels of compensation should be established to avoid exploitation of
under-informed communities).
208
See infra Part III.B.2.
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granted to an entire jurisdiction, but the harms are more localized.
Instead, compensation should be tied as closely as possible to the
scope of the harm. This would limit both externality and internality
problems, leading to greater efficiency. Denis Brion provides a potential model in the form of a "neighborhood district," based on the
special services district common in many states. The "neighborhood district" would be charged20solely
with negotiating compensa9
tion and mitigation agreements.
The ideal compensation system, in order to achieve efficient siting, would accordingly be preventative or incentive-based,
ongoing, legislative or negotiated (provided however, that procedural safeguards accompany the negotiation process), and scaled to
the scope of the harm caused by the LULU.
2. Moral Objections
Some environmental justice advocates oppose compensated
siting proposals on moral grounds. Robert Bullard has coined the
term "environmental blackmail" to refer to such plans. 210 Vicki
Been usefully classifies these moral objections into four broad
categories. 2 11 First, LULUs involve risks to health some argue
should not be commodified. 212 This argument is generally unpersuasive. Society commonly allows individuals to take risks in exchange for compensation. Many professions include a risk premium that provides additional compensation for abnormally dangerous jobs. More importantly, it is not clear that a community that
accepts a LULU is actually increasing its total level of risk. The
increased income that a compensation package provides can decrease countervailing risks associated with poverty. Compensation

209
210

ties, in

See Brion, supra note 116, at 498-502.
See Robert Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority CommuniRACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 82 (BUNYAN

BRYANT & MOHAi eds., Westview Press, 1992).

See Been, supra note 201, at 498-502
See Margaret J Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1903-37 (1987). The anti-commodification argument is based the market inalienability theory of developed by Margaret J. Radin.
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can pay for health-care costs or better nutrition, the benefits of
which may exceed the risks associated with a LULU.213
Second, compensated siting proposals may result in disproportionate siting. Poor communities may value the compensation a
LULU offers more than wealthier communities because of the declining marginal utility of capital. Some environmental justice advocates find such an outcome inherently unjust.2 14 If compensation
mechanisms are carefully crafted to avoid disparities in bargaining
power, such a disparity should be recognized as an accurate gauge
of community preferences. Siting a LULU in the community that
values a compensation package the most increases total utility in
the same way any competitive market transaction does.
Third, compensated siting may allow current residents to
trade away the rights of future generations. This argument is another manifestation of the externality problem. Current residents
making a decision on a compensation package may receive all the
benefits of the compensation, but pay only a fraction of the costs
associated with the LULU. This problem can be overcome by
structuring compensation so that it is distributed on an ongoing basis, and encouraging a cooperative relationship between community and developer that allows for periodic renegotiation as new
information, technology, or circumstances arise.
Finally, compensation schemes can be seen as immoral
unless they are truly voluntary. This concern is especially poignant
if compensation is established by statutory formula. In addition to
the social justice concerns, such programs may also decrease efficiency. Individuals who feel cheated by a compensation package
experience "demoralization costs." 215 This problem is less evident
if compensation results from negotiation, but in either case, high213

See Lambert & Boerner, supra note 30, at 220-21 (noting that the eco-

nomic growth related to a landfill in Sumter County, Alabama may have been a
factor in dramatically decreasing the infant mortality rate in the overwhelmingly
black town of Emelle).
214
See e.g., Bullard, supra note 212.
215
Frank I. Michelman, Property Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165
(1967) (the phrase originated with Frank Michelman's template for examining
the utility of compensation for government takings but is applicable to environmental justice as well); see Gauna, supra note 196, at 42-45.
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lights the importance of procedural aspects of the program. A
process which is transparent, allows for public participation, and
produces arguably
just results is less likely to impose demoraliza2 16
costs.
tion
To summarize the efficiency analysis of proposed environmental justice solutions, the specifics of any program are crucial. While the equal protection model will probably result in little
efficiency gain, the due process and property models can reduce
the inefficiency caused by environmental injustice-related process
failure. Under the due process model, reforms that allow greater
public participation on a resource-neutral basis can force LULU
developers to consider the costs they impose on poor and minority
communities. Similarly, compensation programs that are generally
applicable, or that empower communities to take part in balanced
negotiation, can overcome process failure and root out those LULUs that would be inefficient.
CONCLUSION

In this article, I have attempted to highlight an unappreciated aspect of environmental injustice. The harms caused by LULUs are
not considered by the market. Instead, a multi-level regulatory regime attempts to reach the optimal level of pollution through the
political process. That process, unfortunately, fails to fully consider the costs imposed on poor and minority communities, leading
to pollution that is socially inefficient.
I do not purport to offer a rigorous analysis of this phenomena; indeed quantification of soft racism, the scope of poor communities' collective action dilemmas, or the dollar cost of these
process failures would be difficult if not impossible. Instead, I
hope to provide a new rationale for addressing environmental injustice that does not depend on the often divisive issue of distribution. Furthermore, this Article provides the theoretical underpin-

216

See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action,

and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 85-89 (2003) (focusing on the importance of
the perception that other communities are bearing a fair share of burdens in a

community's choice to accept compensation).
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nings for the many environmental justice advocates demanding
"not in anybody's backyard."
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